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Informal Concepts in Machines∗
Kurt Ammon†
Abstract
This paper constructively proves the existence of an effective pro-
cedure generating a computable (total) function that is not contained
in any given effectively enumerable set of such functions. The proof
implies the existence of machines that process informal concepts such
as computable (total) functions beyond the limits of any given Turing
machine or formal system, that is, these machines can, in a certain
sense, “compute” function values beyond these limits. We call these
machines creative. We argue that any “intelligent” machine should
be capable of processing informal concepts such as computable (total)
functions, that is, it should be creative. Finally, we introduce hypothe-
ses on creative machines which were developed on the basis of theo-
retical investigations and experiments with computer programs. The
hypotheses say that machine intelligence is the execution of a self-
developing procedure starting from any universal programming lan-
guage and any input.
1 Introduction
Hilbert’s program aimed to reduce mathematics to a formal system in order
to avoid inconsistencies in mathematics. In particular, Hilbert’s Entschei-
dungsproblem (decision problem) aimed to find “a procedure that allows one
to decide on the validity, respectively satisfiability, of a given logical expres-
sion by a finite number of operations”.1 In order to prove that Hilbert’s
∗This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works
3.0 Unported License (see http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/3.0/).
†Correspondence to paper at cstruct period org. Comments are welcome.
1Hilbert and Ackermann [1928, p. 73]: ein Verfahren ..., das bei einem vorgelegten
logischen Ausdruck durch endlich viele Operationen die Entscheidung u¨ber die Allgeme-
ingu¨ltigkeit bzw. Erfu¨llbarkeit erlaubt.
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Entscheidungsproblem is unsolvable, Turing [1936] introduced his “comput-
ing machines” which are a formalization of a procedure in Hilbert’s sense.
Go¨del [1965, p. 72] writes:
Turing’s work gives an analysis of the concept of “mechanical
procedure” (alias “algorithm” ...) ... This concept is shown to be
equivalent with that of a “Turing machine”. A formal system can
simply be defined to be any mechanical procedure for producing
formulas, called provable formulas.
Hopcroft and Ullman [1979, p. 147] write that “the Turing machine
is equivalent in computing power to the digital computer as we know it
today”. They implicitly assume that the computer is used for executing a
given procedure or program that was developed manually. Turing [1986] asks
whether a computer can be used in another way:
It has been said that computing machines can only carry out the
processes that they are instructed to do. ... Up till the present
machines have only be been used in this way. But is it necessary
that they should always be used in such a manner?
Turing [1969] discusses the development of intelligence in man and in ma-
chines:
If the untrained infant’s mind is to become an intelligent one,
it must acquire both discipline and initiative. So far we have
been considering only discipline. To convert a brain or machine
into a universal machine is the extremest form of discipline. But
discipline is certainly not enough in itself to produce intelligence.
That which is required in addition we call initiative. ... Our task
is to discover the nature of this residue as it occurs in man, and
to try and copy it in machines.
We investigate “the nature of this residue” called “initiative” (see Sieg, 1994,
Section 5, Final remarks). Section 2 proves the existence of an effective pro-
cedure generating a computable (total) function that is not contained in any
given effective enumeration of such functions. This procedure can be re-
garded as a bridge to the informal concept of computable (total) functions,
that is, to Turing’s uncomputable residue. On the basis of this procedure
Section 3 defines creative machines which can, in a certain sense, “compute”
function values beyond the limits of any given Turing machine. Section 4
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introduces hypotheses on creative machines which say that Turing’s uncom-
putable residue is the execution of a self-developing procedure starting from
any universal programming language and any input. This process, which
produces formally irreducible experience, can be regarded as a new use of
computers. The remaining sections discuss our proof, creative machines and
related work.
2 First Theorems
In this and the following sections we simply write computable function for an
effectively computable total function of natural numbers which is defined for
all natural numbers.
Theorem 1 There is an effective procedure generating a computable function
that is not contained in any given effective enumeration of such functions.
Proof. Let f1, f2, ... be an effective enumeration of computable functions.
We define a new function g by
g(n) = fn(n) + 1 (1)
for all natural numbers n. Obviously, g(n) is defined for all natural numbers
n because fi(n) is defined for all natural numbers i and all natural numbers n.
Furthermore, g is computable because f1, f2, ... is an effective enumeration of
computable functions according to our original assumption. The expression
fn(n) + 1 in the definition (1) of g can be regarded as a functional pseu-
docode, that is, as a computer program, say R, that computes the function
g for all natural numbers n. There is an effective procedure that generates
the program R. This procedure can be represented as a computer program
whose input is the effective enumeration f1, f2, ..., that is, a program, say
E, generating the functions f1, f2, ..., and whose output is the program R.
In order to generate g(n) from any natural number n, the program R thus
generates the function fn by applying E to n and then adds 1 to the result of
applying fn to n. Because of definition (1), g(n) is different from fn(n) for all
natural numbers n. This implies that the computable function g is different
from all functions fn, where n is any natural number. Therefore, there is an
effective procedure generating a computable function g that is not contained
in any given effective enumeration of such functions.
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Theorem 2 There is an effective procedure generating a computable function
that is not contained in any given formal system with a predicate for such
functions.
Proof. Let S be a formal system with a predicate Q for computable func-
tions. Because a formal system can be regarded as a mechanical procedure or
algorithm producing provable formulas (Go¨del 1965, p. 72), the formal sys-
tem S produces an effective enumeration of provable formulas Q(f1), Q(f2), ...
that contains an effective enumeration of all computable functions f1, f2, ...
in S. According to Theorem 1 there is an effective procedure generating a
computable function that not contained in the effective enumeration of all
computable functions f1, f2, ... in S.
Theorem 2 implies that the concept of computable functions is informal in
the sense that the effective procedure in the theorem generates a computable
function beyond the limits of any given formal system.
3 Creative Machines
We apply Theorem 1 to a hypothetical machine C capable of processing
an effective procedure that exists according to Theorem 1. There are no
assumptions on the internal structure of C. In particular, it is not assumed
that C is a Turing machine in any sense.
Theorem 3 Let C be a machine capable of processing an effective procedure
P that exists according to Theorem 1. Then, there is no Turing machine
generating all computable functions that C can generate by means of P .2
Proof. Let C be a machine capable of processing an effective procedure P
that exists according to Theorem 1 and let T be any Turing machine gener-
ating any enumeration f1, f2, ... of computable functions. The enumeration
f1, f2, ... is effective because it is generated by a Turing machine. The ma-
chine C can generate a function g by applying the effective procedure P
to this effective enumeration. According to Theorem 1 the function g is a
computable function that is not contained in the enumeration f1, f2, ... of
computable functions. Therefore, there is no Turing machine T generating
all computable functions that C can generate by means of P .
2The theorems and proofs will be described more precisely in a separate paper.
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Theorem 4 Let C be a machine capable of processing an effective proce-
dure P that exists according to Theorem 1. Then, there is no formal system
containing all computable functions that C can generate by means of P .
Proof. Let C be a machine capable of processing an effective procedure P
that exists according to Theorem 1 and let S be any formal system with
a predicate Q for computable (total) functions. Because a formal system
can be regarded as a mechanical procedure or algorithm producing prov-
able formulas (see Go¨del 1965, p. 72), the formal system S produces an
effective enumeration of provable formulas Q(f1), Q(f2), ... that contains all
computable functions f1, f2, ... in the formal system S. The machine C can
generate a function g by applying the effective procedure P to the effective
enumeration f1, f2, ... of functions. According to Theorem 1 the function g is
a computable function that is not contained in the enumeration f1, f2, ... of
functions. Therefore, there is no formal system S containing all computable
functions that C can generate by means of P .
Because all programs of a programming language are finite sequences of a
fixed finite number of symbols, they can be effectively enumerated, for exam-
ple, in ascending length. This implies that there is an effective enumeration
of all computable partial functions which need not be defined for all natu-
ral numbers. Thus, Theorem 1 implies that the function deciding whether
or not a computable partial function is a total function is uncomputable,
that is, not computable. If this function were computable, its application to
an effective enumeration of all computable partial functions would yield an
effective enumeration of all computable (total) functions. This contradicts
Theorem 1. For these reasons, the function deciding whether a computable
partial function is a total function is uncomputable. Thus, the function g in
the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4, which is generated by the hypothetical ma-
chine C, is a value of this uncomputable function that is not contained in the
given Turing machine T and the given formal system S, respectively. There-
fore, Theorems 3 and 4 imply that the hypothetical machine C can compute
values of this uncomputable function beyond the limits of any given Turing
machine or formal system. This suggests the following definition for a new
kind of machines.
Definition 1 A machine is called creative if it is capable of evaluating func-
tions, that is, determining function values beyond the limits of any given
Turing machine or formal system.
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In view of Theorem 3 creative machines can process the informal concept of
computable functions beyond the limits of any given Turing machine. In par-
ticular, the effective procedure P in the theorem can be regarded as a bridge
to this informal concept, that is, to Turing’s uncomputable “residue”. The
next section introduces hypotheses on the development of creative machines
and their mode of operation. The hypotheses provide more information on
the nature of Turing’s “residue”.
4 Hypotheses
Let P be a computer program whose properties are not known, that is, we
have no or only partial knowledge about P . We can apply P to an input,
for example, the natural number 1, which may produce the natural number
2. Thus, the execution of P produces knowledge which can be represented
in function notation by
P (1) = 2. (2)
We may apply the program P to another input, for example, the natural
number 2, which may produce the natural number 3, that is, the knowledge
P (2) = 3. (3)
From (2) and (3), we may assume by fallible inductive reasoning that
P (n) = n+ 1 (4)
holds for all natural numbers n. This simple example illustrates how knowl-
edge about a program can be produced by the execution of the program and
fallible inductive reasoning.
In order to develop a computer program a programmer usually applies
all available knowledge. When the program is written, he tests it to verify
whether it has the desired properties, that is, he has only partial knowledge
about the program. In his tests he executes the program which produces fur-
ther knowledge, for example, whether it generates an output from any input.
Finally, he concludes on the basis of the tests and all available knowledge that
the program has the desired properties. This conclusion can be regarded as
fallible inductive reasoning. Thus, program development usually involves the
application of all available knowledge, the execution of the program in tests
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to produce further knowledge, and fallible inductive reasoning to conclude
whether the program has the desired properties.
The expression n+1 in (4) can be regarded as a program computing the
natural number n+1 from any natural number n. It can be constructed from
the elementary knowledge that n and 1 are natural numbers and x + y is a
natural number for any natural numbers x and y. If we regard the variable
n und the constant 1 in the expression n + 1 as nullary functions (without
arguments) whose values are natural numbers, the expression n+ 1 in (4) is
just the composition of the functions n, 1, and + that are contained in n+1.
The composition of functions can be used as an elementary mechanism
for the construction of sophisticated programs. For example, Ammon [1988]
describes the automatic development of a program that proves theorems in
mathematics whose complexity represented the state of the art in automated
theorem proving. The program is also constructed on the basis of elementary
functions that form the components of the program such as the “left-side”
x of an equation x = y (see Ammon 1988, p. 559, Table 2). Starting “from
scratch” compositions of the elementary functions are used to construct ”a se-
quence of more and more powerful partial methods [programs] each of which
forms the basis for the construction of its successor until a complete method
[program] is generated” [Ammon, 1988, p. 558, Abstract]. The elementary
functions themselves which form the components of the program, for exam-
ple, the “left-side” x of an equation x = y, can be constructed on the basis
of the elementary instructions or functions of a programming language.
The preceding considerations formed a starting point for the following
hypotheses about creative machines. The next sections provide further ar-
guments. In the hypotheses, a programming language is meant to include
elementary knowledge about the language, for example, the domains and
ranges of its elementary instructions or functions which can be used to form
compositions of the instructions or functions. Roughly speaking, the first
hypothesis states that the knowledge in a creative machine is developed in a
formally irreducible empirical process from a programming language.
Hypothesis 1 (Experience) A creative machine is the execution of a self-
developing procedure including knowledge which starts from any universal
programming language and any input. This process produces formally irre-
ducible experience, that is, the self-developing procedure cannot be reduced
to a formal system but the language and the input from which it starts. The
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development of the procedure can be illustrated by the formula
L+ Pt + E → Pt+1, (5)
where L is the universal programming language including knowledge about
L itself, Pt is the procedure at time t = 0, 1, 2, ..., P0 is empty, and E stands
for experience.
The second hypothesis refers to informal concepts such as the computable
functions in Theorems 3 and 4.
Hypothesis 2 (Structure) The knowledge in a creative machine according
to Hypothesis 1 contains informal concepts that are extensible beyond the
limits of any given Turing machine or formal system.
The third hypothesis deals with inductive reasoning, that is, the construction
of knowledge in a creative system.
Hypothesis 3 (Induction) In practice the construction of knowledge in a
creative machine is achieved by informal inductive reasoning that is based on
all available knowledge including informal concepts according to Hypothesis
2.
The last two hypotheses say that a creative system can revise all its knowledge
and construct any knowledge.
Hypothesis 4 (Revision) A creative machine may revise all its knowledge
but a universal programming language from which it starts according to
Hypothesis 1. In principle, all knowledge is fallible and correctable by the
machine.
Hypothesis 5 (Generality) A creative machine can in principle construct
and verify any knowledge including all knowledge about itself as far as the
knowledge can be constructed and verified.
5 Discussion
We discuss creative machines, in particular, in view of the Church-Turing
thesis. The next section compares related work, for example, the Turing
machine concept.
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In order to apply an effective procedure P according to Theorem 1 in
Section 2, a creative machine C according to Definition 1 in Section 3 needs
an effective enumeration of computable functions, say E1. A simple example
is an enumeration of functions f1, f2, ... defined by fi(n) = i for all natural
numbers i and natural numbers n. By applying the effective procedure P
to E1 the machine C can generate a computable function, say g1, which
is not contained in E1 according to Theorem 1. The function g1 can be
added to E1 which yields an effective enumeration g1, f1, f2, ..., say E2.
Thus, starting from any effective enumeration E1 of computable functions a
creative machine C can, by repeatedly applying P , generate a sequence E1,
E2, ... of effective enumerations of computable functions where En has the
form gn−1, ..., g1, f1, f2, ... for any natural number n greater than 1. In
particular, each En contains another computable function gn−1 that in not
contained in any preceding Ei, where i is a natural number less than n.
An effective enumeration E1 of computable functions can be provided by a
Turing machine, say T1 generating the functions in E1 or by a formal system,
say F1, with a predicate for the computable functions in E1. By applying
an effective procedure P according to Theorem 1 a creative machine C can
generate a computable function, say g1. Theorems 1 and 2 in Section 2
imply that the function g1 is neither generated by the Turing machine T1 nor
contained in the formal system F1. The incorporation of g1 into the Turing
machine T1 and the formal system F1 yields a more powerful Turing machine
T2 and a more powerful formal system F2. Thus, a creative machine C can,
by repeatedly applying P , generate a sequence of more and more powerful
Turing machines T1, T2, ... and a sequence of more and more powerful formal
systems F1, F2, ..., respectively.
Up to any point in time a creative system C can only “know” a finite
description of computable functions which can be represented by a Turing
machine, say T1, generating the functions or in a formal system, say F1, with
a predicate for the functions. As described above the creative machine C
can, by repeatedly applying an effective procedure P according to Theorem
1 to T1 or F1, generate more and more powerful Turing machines T1, T2, ...
and more and more powerful formal systems F1, F2, ..., respectively. Thus, a
creative system C can generate “knowledge”, that is, computable functions
beyond the limits of its own knowledge in the Turing machine T1 and the
formal system F1.
According to our considerations preceding Definition 1 in Section 3, the
propositional function (predicate), say d, deciding whether or not a com-
9
putable partial function of natural numbers is a total function is uncom-
putable. The preceding paragraphs in this section imply that a creative sys-
tem can determine an unlimited number of values of the function d beyond
its “knowledge”, that is, it can repeatedly generate computable functions
beyond the limits of its “knowledge”, which is finitely describable, and the
limits of a given Turing machine or formal system. The Church-Turing thesis
states that every effectively calculable function is computable by a Turing
machine (see Kleene 1952, pp. 317-323, 376-381). A creative machine can
determine values of the function d beyond its finitely describable ”knowl-
edge” but it cannot calculate the value of the function d(x) ”for each value
of x for which it is defined” (see Kleene 1987, p. 493), that is, it cannot de-
termine for each computable partial function x whether x is a total function.
Therefore, a creative system can compute values of uncomputable functions
beyond the limits of given Turing machines or formal systems, but this has
no bearing on what number-theoretic functions are effectively calculable (see
Kleene 1987, p. 493). Furthermore, the computable functions generated by
a creative machine cannot be specified in advance but must be generated
by repeated applications of an effective procedure according to Theorem 1.
This process involves the generation of a sequence of more and more powerful
effective enumerations of computable functions, equivalent Turing machines,
or equivalent formal systems each of which forms the basis for the genera-
tion of its successor. Roughly speaking, this process can be regarded as a
self-developing procedure which must be generated step by step and cannot
be reduced to a finite description given in advance (see Theorems 3 and 4 in
Section 3). Kleene [1987, p. 493] requires that an “effective calculation pro-
cedure” or “algorithm” is ”fixed in advance for all calculations” and that it
is ”possible to convey a complete finite description of the effective procedure
or algorithm by a finite communication, in advance of performing compu-
tations in accordance with it”. For any computable (total) function that a
creative system can generate it can give a complete finite description of its
generation but there is no complete finite description for the generation of
all computable functions it can generate (see Theorems 3 and 4).
Hypothesis 1 in Section 4 states that the knowledge in a creative machine
is developed in a formally irreducible empirical process that starts from a
programming language and any input. As described above, the development
of knowledge is formally irreducible because it must be generated step by step
and cannot be reduced to a finite description given in advance. For exam-
ple, this process can involve the generation of a sequence of more and more
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powerful Turing machines or formal systems each of which forms the basis
for the generation of its successor (see Theorems 3 and 4). In a comparable
process Ammon [1988] generates programs on the basis of elementary func-
tions that form the components of the final programs. Starting from scratch,
compositions of the elementary functions are used to construct a sequence of
more and more powerful partial programs each of which forms the basis for
the construction of its successor until a complete program is generated (see
Section 4).
According to Hypothesis 2 a creative machine contains informal concepts
such as computable functions. These concepts are processed by effective
procedures such as an effective procedure according to Theorem 1. But
according to Theorems 3 and 4 they are extensible beyond the limits of any
given Turing machine or formal system. This means that informal concepts
are processed by effective (finite) procedures although there is no complete
formal (finite) description of these concepts.
According to Hypothesis 3 knowledge is constructed by informal inductive
reasoning that is based on all available knowledge. As described in Section
4 a model of such reasoning processes is the development of computer pro-
grams which are empirically verified in tests and then used in practice. Such
an empirical verification requires only limited resources such as time. This
means that informal inductive reasoning is regarded as more efficient in prac-
tice than sophisticated formal procedures. Because all available knowledge
can be used there is no sophisticated formal method for the construction of
knowledge that can specified in advance.
The fourth hypothesis implies that a creative machine may start from
scratch, that is, from any programming language and any input. Thus, it
can revise any knowledge that proves to be false in a specific case.
The last hypothesis says that a creative machine can construct and verify
any knowledge including knowledge about itself. Here, “any knowledge”
includes any knowledge that can be constructed by a human and is finitely
describable.
According to Definition 1 in Section 3 a creative machine is capable of
evaluating functions beyond the limits of any given Turing machine or formal
system. This means that it is capable of evaluating uncomputable functions.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 imply that this evaluation ordinarily involves empiri-
cal inductive reasoning that is fallible and correctable, that is, the values
f(x) of uncomputable functions f a creative machine assigns to arguments x
may be false but can be corrected by the machine. An example of an uncom-
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putable function is the uncomputable propositional function (predicate) that
determines whether a computable partial function is a total function. The
development of computer programs provides a model for the evaluation of
this uncomputable predicate because, for example, a program must produce
an output for any input for which the program is defined.
How can we use our insight into the nature of Turing’s residue, in partic-
ular, into the evaluation of uncomputable functions to implement a creative
machine? Turing [1969] writes: “Our task is to discover the nature of this
residue as it occurs in man, and to try and copy it in machines.” According
to our hypotheses we must choose a programming language and implement
knowledge about this language, for example, the domains and ranges of the
elementary functions or instructions it contains. In order to reduce the com-
plexity of a first implementation we should reduce the number and complexity
of the informal concepts to be implemented. A concrete project might aim
to prove theorems in a mathematics textbook on the basis of preceding the-
orems and proofs (see Ammon 1988). According to our approach no formal
system, which eliminates Turing’s residue, should be used but the ordinary
representation of theorems and proofs should be modeled. Another possible
field of application might aim at an automatic development of programs. An
implementation of a creative machine would be general and complete if it
can change all its source code and develop new knowledge from scratch, that
is, from a universal programming language. Obviously, Ammon [1988] is far
from a general and complete system in our sense.
The theorems and hypotheses on creative machines have epistemological
implications. For example, informal concepts such as computable functions
are extensible beyond any formal limits. Because a creative machine can
construct and revise any knowledge starting from any programming language
and any input there is only a rather limited general description of its structure
and development, in particular, its starting point. This is comparable with
Piaget’s [1970, p. 704] view: ”Knowledge, then, at its origin, neither arises
from objects nor from the subject, but from interactions - at first inextricable
- between the subject and those objects.”
6 Related Work
Ordinarily, the word “machine” refers to a Turing machine which is a for-
malization of the concept of an algorithm or effective procedure (see Hopcroft
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and Ullman 1979, pp. 146-147). In contrast, Theorems 3 and 4 contain no
assumptions on the machine C but its capability to process an effective pro-
cedure P according to Theorem 1. In particular, the effective procedure P
and the machine C are regarded as different entities. Thus, Theorems 3 and
4 can be applied to any machine capable of processing the effective procedure
P .
If one requires that a creative machine can execute any Turing machine it
can compute any computable function and evaluate uncomputable functions
as described in this paper.
One might ask whether the machine C in Theorem 3 can be modeled
by a Turing machine generating computable functions, say T , into which an
effective procedure P according to Theorem 1 is incorporated. But according
to Theorem 3 the machine C could apply P to T to generate a computable
function that is not generated by T . Therefore, the Turing machine T cannot
model the machine C, that is, it cannot generate a computable function
beyond the limits of any given Turing machine.
Turing [1936, p. 232] writes: “the motion of the machine ... is completely
determined by the configuration” which comprises a condition from a “finite
number of conditions” and a “scanned symbol”. The behavior of a creative
machine cannot be completely determined in advance because it contains
informal concepts such as computable functions which cannot be reduced
to a finite description given in advance (see Theorems 3 and 4). But at
any moment and at the most basic level the next “instruction” is completely
determined by the present state of a creative machine, which can be regarded
as a finite string of symbols or binary digits, and the input processed by the
creative machine.
Turing [1936, pp. 249-250] attempts to show that his machines can com-
pute “all numbers which would naturally be regarded as computable” and
supposes that the “number of states of mind” is finite. Go¨del [1990b, p. 306]
points out that “mental procedures” may “go beyond mechanical procedures
... mind, in its use, is not static, but constantly developing, i.e., that we
understand abstract terms more and more precisely as we go on using them
... although at each stage the number and precision of the abstract terms
at our disposal may be finite, both (and, therefore, also Turing’s number of
distinguishable states of mind) may converge toward infinity in the course
of the application of the [mental] procedure”. The “abstract terms” refer to
abstract concepts such as ”a certain concept of computable function” (Go¨del
1990a, p. 271) and “the use of abstract terms on the basis of their meaning”
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(Go¨del 1965, p. 72, footnote **). Creative machines can process informal
concepts such as computable functions. Beyond any given Turing machine
or formal system they can generate an unbounded number of such functions
which can be regarded as a part of the extensible meaning of this informal
concept.
Our paper is no contribution to formal logic. Rather, we leave formal logic
on the basis of Theorems 3 and 4 and our hypotheses on creative machines.
We allow creative machines to apply Cantor’s diagonalization to informal
concepts such as computable functions in Turing machines and formal sys-
tems which are restricted to enumerable subsets of nonenumerable sets that
are contained in these concepts. At any point in time a creative machine can
only contain such an enumerable subset but it can generate an unbounded
number of more and more extended subsets. A creative machine can simply
refute the claim that it is modeled by a Turing machine or a formal system
by applying an effective procedure according to Theorem 1 to the machine
or system.
We argue that any “intelligent” machine should be capable of process-
ing informal concepts such as computable functions beyond the limits of any
given Turing machine or formal system, that is, it should be creative. For-
mal descriptions restrict the generality of a machine, in particular, informal
concepts such as computable functions.
Go¨del’s theorem says that every sufficiently powerful consistent formal
number theory contains an undecidable proposition. Lucas [1961] argues
that mind cannot be modeled by a Turing machine because he knows that
the undecidable proposition is true. Putnam points out that Lucas cannot
prove the prerequisite of consistency in Go¨del’s theorem (see Shapiro 1998,
pp. 282-284). The machine C in Theorem 3 can process an effective proce-
dure P that produces a computable function g from an effective enumera-
tion of such functions. This enumeration is comparable with the consistent
number theory in Go¨del’s theorem and the function g with the undecidable
proposition. If a creative machine “knows” an effective enumeration of com-
putable functions it can also “know” the computable function g which is not
contained in the enumeration. The prerequisite of an effective enumeration
of computable functions can be satisfied because there are simple examples
of such enumerations and, up to any point in time, a creative machine C can
only “know” a finite description of computable functions which can be rep-
resented by such an enumeration (see Section 5). Without any assumptions
on the structure of mind but its capability to process an effective proce-
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dure according to Theorem 1 these considerations also apply to humans who
can thus extend their knowledge beyond any formal limits. Post’s [1944, p.
295] conclusion from Go¨del’s theorem is that “mathematical thinking is ...
essentially creative” (see Shapiro 1998, pp. 291-292, “creative step”).
7 Conclusion
Turing points out that intelligence requires a “residue” called “initiative”
that is not captured by his machines. We introduced the concept of a cre-
ative machine by requiring that it can evaluate uncomputable functions in
a certain sense. It is capable of extending informal concepts such as (total)
computable functions beyond any given formal description which is restricted
to incomplete enumerable parts of these concepts. We argue that “intelli-
gent” machines should be capable of processing such concepts. Hypotheses
on creative machines say that Turing’s uncomputable “residue” is the ex-
ecution of a self-developing procedure that starts from any programming
language and any input. This process, which produces formally irreducible
experience, can be regarded as a new use of computers.
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